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produce privacy concerns among the people in these cities (as inhabitants, workers, visitors, and otherwise).
The framework is built on the basis of two recurring dimensions in research about people's concerns about pri-
vacy: one dimensions represents that people perceive particular data asmore personal and sensitive than others,
the other dimension represents that people's privacy concerns differ according to the purpose for which data is
collected, with the contrast between service and surveillance purposes most paramount. These two dimensions
produce a 2 × 2 framework that hypothesizes which technologies and data-applications in smart cities are likely
to raise people's privacy concerns, distinguishing between raising hardly any concern (impersonal data, service
purpose), to raising controversy (personal data, surveillance purpose). Speciﬁc examples from the city of Rotter-
damare used to further explore and illustrate the academic and practical usefulness of the framework. It is argued
that the general hypothesis of the framework offers clear directions for further empirical research and theory
building about privacy concerns in smart cities, and that it provides a sensitizing instrument for local govern-
ments to identify the absence, presence, or emergence of privacy concerns among their citizens.
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Local governments across the world are in the middle of technolog-
ical and economic developments that come together in the catch-all
label of ‘smart cities’. In a smart city, ICT-infused infrastructures enable
the extensive monitoring and steering of city maintenance, mobility,
air and water quality, energy usage, visitor movements, neighborhood
sentiment, and so on. Evidently, such processes use and produce mas-
sive amounts of data. In the Dutch city of Rotterdam, for instance, the
trafﬁc authority monitors about 22,000 vehicle movements every
morning,1 while the regional environment agency produces hourly
data about air quality from sensors across greater Rotterdam resulting
in over 175,000 observations per year. The promise of such large
amounts of data for smarter management of cities extends to other sec-
tors as well such as (predictive) policing, crowd control or public senti-
ment monitoring.
The notion of data, in this context, extends beyond the big numbers
churned out by monitoring technologies, but also includes the data
present in city registers, the data from government or corporate surveys
and the data from social media updates. These data are ever more oftentail/3668009/2014/06/06/
ers.dhtml.
. This is an open access article undercombined and linked in order to produce joint indicators of city well-
being, economic vitality or safety. Increasingly, local governments
make these data also available to the wider public. All of this raises is-
sues about who has legitimate access, which data can be opened up to
public usage, what is the appropriate privacy framework for the linkage
of different data? In these discussions, issues like political and public ac-
ceptance of smart cities are important as is the question of everyday ex-
periences in such ‘dataﬁed’ cities (Powell, 2014).While some claim that
‘big data’ will help cities become richer, cleaner and more efﬁcient,
others argue that cities will turn into data-driven robotic places where
creativity and deviance have no place. Kitchin (2014a) argues that
there is little attention for such ‘politics of city data’ nor for the question
how particular practices of data collection and analysis may have prob-
lematic social effects. He adds that the ubiquitous collection of data
about all city processesmay produce ‘panoptic’ cities, inwhich “systems
that seek to enable more effective modes of governance [may] also
threaten to stiﬂe rights to privacy, conﬁdentiality, and freedom of ex-
pression” (p 12).
This paper forms part of these debates and starts from the assump-
tion that it is necessary to acknowledge people's concerns about their
privacy in the further development of smart cities in order to maintain
their support and participation (e.g. Townsend, 2013), as will be ex-
plained in more detail in Section 3. Without such an acknowledgement
smart city projects have been seen to become controversial and
abolished.the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ing people's speciﬁc privacy concerns in smart cities on the basis of
existing research about people's privacy concerns in general. Two di-
mensions emerge from the literature: concerns differ with respect to
the kind of data that are involved, which can range from personal to im-
personal data and all degrees and combinations in-between; and con-
cerns vary along the purpose for which purpose are data used, which
canmove from improving the livability and services in a city to advanc-
ing surveillance and keeping citizens in control. The data and purpose
dimensions together form the basis for a 2 × 2 privacy framework in
which smart technologies and applications as well as speciﬁc forms of
data collection and usage can be plotted. The framework is then further
explored and illustrated through a discussion of three concrete exam-
ples. It is argued that the framework offers an instrument for local gov-
ernments to understand and incorporate privacy concerns in their
policy and operational decisions, and that it offers a set of hypotheses
to academic researchers to further conduct research about privacy con-
cerns in smart cities.2. Data landscapes in the smart city
Powell (2014) uses the term ‘data cities’ to indicate that ‘smart’ tech-
nologies like transport systems, air qualitymonitors or CCTV cameras si-
multaneously use and generate enormous amounts of data. Taylor and
Richter (2015) similarly identify (big) data as key to the rise of smart
cities. Bettencourt (2014) makes a more speciﬁc claim when she says
that big data are particularly helpful for more successful urban policies
and planning. Kontokoska (2015) speaks in this respect of computation-
al urban planning. Both big data discourse and smart city discourse tend
to obscure that data have always been crucial to city planning and city
life. Cities started monitoring their populations mostly in the 19th cen-
tury as part of the wider movement towards modern means of
governing the nation state (e.g. Breckenridge & Szreter, 2012). Partly
through civil registrations, partly through bureaucratic and commercial
records, partly through surveys and mapping, the 19th century saw a
similar data avalanche as we are witnessing today and data since has
come to underpin city planning and decisions. Robertson and
Travaglia (2015), therefore, claim that the current big data wave consti-
tutes a difference of speed and size, but not one of analytic principle and
relevance.
To date, such reﬂections on the historical and present-day impor-
tance of data for citymanagement do not include a systematic inventory
of the kinds of data involved.While it is not the purpose of this paper to
provide such a catalogue, to understand the variety of privacy concerns
at stake it is necessary to have at least a preliminary impression of the
diversity of data that are used in and by cities. The table below presents
such an impression for the city of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. It is
based on the discussions, interactions and projects taking place in the
Urban Big Data Lab, a collaboration of two Rotterdam universities and
local government aimed at optimizing the understanding and usage of
big, open and linked data for city policies and planning.2
While the above table is likely to be incomplete and imbalanced, it
does convey the diversity of data in smart cities. Data differ in size, in
regularity, in purpose, in complexity, in ownership, in visibility, and
other matters. Moreover, within big cities oversight of these different
data and streams tends to be lacking (cf. Meijer & Rodríguez Bolívar,
2015). City data emerges from a wide variety of governmental depart-
ments, from private and public stakeholders, from individual citizens
and visitors, and are collected, analyzed and stored without any kind
of central coordination or collaboration. Kaisler, Armour, Espinosa, and
Money (2013) conclude that data diversiﬁes andmultiplies at unprece-
dented and unplanned speed, requiring ever bigger and multiple stor-
age facilities and diverse and combined analytic techniques, while2 See http://www.kenniswerkplaats-urbanbigdata.nl/.engaging different actors who tend to lack knowledge of each other
let alone collaborate.
The complexity of the city data landscape has led many cities to ap-
point chief data ofﬁcers who are responsible for the usage andmanage-
ment of data; in New York, in particular, a Mayor's Ofﬁce of Data
Analytics was established in 2013. Towns (2014, no page) provides
the rationale for these decisions by saying that cities “have struggled
to share and integrate data streams in ways that support comprehen-
sive analysis. Issues around data ownership, as well as privacy laws
and public perception, have been signiﬁcant stumbling blocks.”3. Bringing citizens into the picture
The emerging city data landscape provides local governments with
additional challenges as well. Al Nuaimi, Al Neyadi, Mohamed, and Al-
Jaroodi (2015), for instance, identify ﬁve concrete, operational issues
with respect to data, i.e. sources, sharing, quality, security, privacy and
costs. (e.g. Kitchin, 2014a) takes a critical perspective and shows how
the discourse around big data and smart cities produces a suggestion
of data providing neutral information for rational governance, while
hiding the political and corporate interests. In a similar vein,
Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser (2014) analyze how the term ‘smart
city’ has become a key theme in corporate storytelling, and argue for al-
ternative understandings of smart cities that take public interests into
account. Viitanen and Kingston (2014) provide a concrete analysis of
problems that local governments face when confronted with a corpo-
rate push to adopt smart data technologies and big data applications,
and show how there is a serious risk of following the imperatives of
the market instead of the demands of public policy. According to Datta
(2015), Kitchin (2014b) and Vanolo (2013), such public policy should,
among other things, consider the uneven pace at which cities become
smart. As is clear from the academic literature and even clearer from
the explosion of conferences, seminars, networks, blog posts and social
media updates, the development and the discourse around smart cities
is carried by an urban ‘tech-elite’ of IT corporations, young, well-educat-
ed, mostly white and male professionals, and a-political aspiring city
managers. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that the whole notion
of ‘smart city’ or ‘big data’ and what it entails may be unknown to the
majority of current city inhabitants and visitors (Thomas, Mullagh,
Wang, & Dunn, 2015). Reﬂecting on Barcelona, March and Ribera-
Fumaz (2014, p.1) argue therefore that it is imperative to “put citizens
back at the center of urban debate”.
Various suggestions have been made and explored to integrate a
wider group of citizens into smart city design and policies, – for instance
– through citizen participation (Berntzen & Johansson, 2016), crowd
sourcing (Schuurman, Baccarne, De Marez, & Mechant, 2012), citizen-
centered approaches (Gaved, Jones, Kukulska-Hulme, & Scanlon,
2012), or co-creation and living labs (Schaffers et al., 2011). Others
have argued more generally for a stronger protection of the privacy of
citizens living, working, shopping or travelling in a smart cit. Li, Dai,
Ming, and Qiu (2015) identify the over-collection of data as a severe se-
curity risk, especially when it comes to the sensitive data that people
hold on their smart phones. Martinez-Balleste, Perez-Martinez, and
Solanas (2013) similarly fear for the privacy of citizens in smart cities,
especially when it comes to protecting information about their identity,
the kind of information they look for, their location, energy usage and
possessions (see also Bartoli et al., 2011). Privacy scholars offering solu-
tions to privacy risks in smart cities focus on particular technological so-
lutions, such as cloud computing (Kahn, Pervez, & Ghafoor, 2014),
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs, Rebollo-Monedero, Bartoli,
Hernández-Serrano, Forné, & Soriano, 2014) or transparency enhancing
technologies (TETs, Beran, Pignotti, & Edwards et al., no year). Policy
makers have turned to privacy impact assessments as a tool to identify
whether a speciﬁc technology or applications involves a privacy risk and
how this can be mitigated (cf. Wright & De Hert, 2011).
Table 1
City data landscape.
Sector Domain Kind of data Example of application
Infrastructure Transport and asset management, built environment Monitoring data, registration data, geo data Trafﬁc and congestion patterns, real time dashboards
Sustainability Energy usage, water, environment, weather Sensor and monitoring data, civic
measurement data
Air quality monitoring and pollution warnings
Health Health, quality of life, well-being, life expectancy Health data, survey data, lifelogging Location speciﬁc noise levels and social or health problems in
speciﬁc neighborhoods
Cohesion Education, social capital, migration,
neighborhoods, housing, crime
Survey data, civic and community web
presence data
School quality in speciﬁc neighborhoods
Commerce Business opportunities, marketing, location based
services
Social media data, open government data Investment maps for attracting new business
Experience Events, leisure, nightlife, tourism, heritage Social media data, archive data,
sensor data
Real time social media analytics for crowd control
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that citizens themselves and their privacy concerns are not addressed.
Yet, the scare research on actual citizen behavior in smart cities does
suggest that the success of particular applications, such as smart cards,
may depend more on citizens' perceptions of privacy and security
risks than on the actual technological, design or policy guarantees of pri-
vacy (e.g. Belanche-Gracia, Casaló-Ariño, & Pérez-Rueda, 2015). Such a
discrepancy between perceptions and ofﬁcial realities is somewhat sim-
ilar to the situationwith crime statistics. They are generally going down,
while public perceptions of the risk of crime is going up, as – among
others - British sociologist Furedi (2007) has discussed extensively. As
a result, crime and safety policies are nowadays asmuchgeared towards
policing fear of crime, as it is to controlling crime itself (Scheider,
Rowell, & Bezdikian, 2003). With privacy concerns in the smart city,
the situation is likely to be the same: they need as much attention as
the design of privacy itself. The following section, therefore, reviews
people's privacy concerns.
4. Privacy concerns and privacy paradox
Privacy research has burgeoned in the past decades as a result of
growing reliance of public and private institutions on digital interac-
tions with citizens and consumers. Several national and international
organisations have identiﬁed privacy as a key policy, regulatory and leg-
islation challenge of the 21st century (e.g. Camenisch, Fischer-Hübner,
& Rannenberg, 2011; Gartner, 2012; OECD, 2011). The research about
people's privacy concerns is diverse and contradictory in terms of theo-
ry (Li, 2012, for instance, identiﬁes 15 different theories of privacy in on-
line contexts), methods (Van Zoonen, 2014 discuss the usage of
experiments, surveys, qualitative interviews and document analysis)
and outcomes (in particular with respect to the (lack of) inﬂuence of
age, gender and other socio-demographic features on privacy concerns
(ibid)). Moreover, the research has identiﬁed two important paradoxes.
Despite people's clearly expressed concerns about their privacy, there is
a simultaneous lack of appropriate secure behavior: the most popular
pin code used is 12343 and many people use one password for multiple
accounts (CIS, 2011; Van Zoonen, 2014).Moreover, they share their per-
sonal information on numerous social media sites, despite the fact that
they do not feel very secure on, for instance, Facebook (Pew, 2015). In
the relevant literature, this contrast between concerns and behavior is
known as the ‘privacy paradox’ (e.g. Young & Quan-Haase, 2013). A fur-
ther complication in privacy behavior comes from a ‘control paradox’
describing how the feeling of being in control over delivering or regis-
tering one's data leads to less concern about how one's data are later
used by other parties (Brandimarte, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2013).
Notwithstanding the disorder in the ﬁeld, three consistent dimen-
sions come up over and again as factors inﬂuencing people's concerns3 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10215714/Easy-as-1234-
the-most-popular-PIN-codes-revealed.html.about privacy: these relate to the type of data involved, the purpose of
data collection and usage, and the organization or persons collecting
and using the data.
4.1. Kinds of data
Although there are unequivocal legal deﬁnitions of what personal
data or personally identiﬁable data are (e.g. in the General Data Protec-
tion Regulation of the EU and in US privacy law), people themselves
have less consistent sensitivities when it comes to what they consider
to be personal data. Various national and cross-national surveys have
found that people consider medical, ﬁnancial and civic data is consid-
ered highly sensitive, while one's nationality, gender or age are consid-
ered less problematic (a.o. BCG, 2013; Cranor, Reagle, & Ackerman,
2000; Eurobarometer, 2011; InfoSys, 2013). However, there is increas-
ing anxiety about the possibility of combining seemingly impersonal
data into highly personal citizen or consumer proﬁles (Harris, Sleight,
& Webber, 2005; Tene & Polonetsky, 2012). When it comes to data
emerging from biometric measurements there is variation in people's
concerns: Prabhakar, Pankanti, and Jain (2003) claim that people ﬁnd
the usage of data from iris scans much less acceptable than usage of
the data coming from systems of face recognition. People also differ in
how sensitive they consider their social media updates or consumption
patterns; for some people such data are highly private, for others they
are trouble-free (Eurobarometer, 2011). While there is no research
that has examined how people feel about the collection of impersonal
data about, for instance, trafﬁc ﬂows or air quality, there is little reason
to expect that peoplewill be concerned about it. These data reveal noth-
ing about individual people and hence will probably fall outside of the
realm of privacy worries.
4.2. Purpose of data
Second, the research about privacy concerns suggests that people as-
sess for which purpose data is used and weigh the beneﬁts that provid-
ing their data may offer them. When these beneﬁts are of immediate
personal relevance (medical services, commercial gain), most people
are willing to share their data with the organization asking for them
(e.g. Acquisti, John, & Loewenstein, 2013). They do make, however, a
tradeoff between the amount of data asked for and the beneﬁts received
in exchange and asking too much data quickly leads to a sense of being
watched rather than being serviced (ibid). Beneﬁts of data sharing that
have a wider, social goal are less easily accepted as a worthwhile trade
off. Sanquist, Mahy, and Morris (2008), for instance, found that the ac-
ceptance of the US government monitoring personal communications
was high in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks but declined
after about half a year.
A complicating factor for citizens and consumers to assess the pur-
pose of data collection, comes from concern that their data are used
Fig. 1. Smart city privacy challenges.
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EU regulation explicitly forbids this, it nevertheless keeps coming up as
a major concern among citizens (Van Zoonen & Turner, 2013). Two ex-
amples further emphasize public suspicions about the secondary usage
of their data: when, in The Netherlands in 2014, ING bank announced
that it would share its client data with commercial parties, immediate
public anger arose, people changed banks and in the end INGwithdrew
their plans and was forced to apologize (see Van Gaal, 2014). A data-
sharing scheme of the UK National Health Service similarly came
under attack when it appeared that themedical records kept by general
practitioners would not only be sharedwith other health and care insti-
tutions, but also with commercial third parties, most notably health in-
surance companies (see Kirby, 2014). According to one UK newspaper,
over 700.000 people chose to opt-out of the scheme as a result of the
controversy (Dominiczak, 2015).
4.3. Who collects data?
People's concerns about their privacy also depend on who is dealing
with their personal data. Eurobarometer data from 2011 indicate that
across Europe people trust medical organisations and banks the most
when it comes to their (most sensitive) data (Eurobarometer, 2011).
On the lowest end of the spectrum, the Eurobarometer found telecom
and internet companies, including social media and search engines;
they are least trusted and sometimes even seen to threaten privacy
(also BCG, 2013). In the context of this paper, local government is the
key data-partner and hence the question is whether people trust local
governmentwith their data. In general, opinionpolls consistently report
that people tend to trust their local government much more than their
national ones, for instance 72% trust in local government versus 24% in
national government in the US (reported in Goldsmith, 2015), and
79% in local government versus 11% in national government in the UK
(reported in Walker, 2013). Whether and to what extent citizens will
trust their local governments to handle their personal data correctly
and protect their privacy well, is as yet unclear. On the one hand,
there is ample evidence of local government being an untrustworthy
partner when it comes to data handling (Thompson, Ravindran, &
Nicosia, 2015). On the other hand, there is an emerging debate
whether opening up city data sets for usage by residents and other
stakeholders will increase trust in local government; with one side
of the argument being that “transparency and open data are impor-
tant additions to the democratic toolbox” (O'Hara, 2012, no page),
and the other warning against the myth that an open data policy is
connected to transparency and more trust in government (Janssen,
Charalabidis, & Zuiderwijk, 2012).5. Privacy framework
The ﬁrst two dimensions of people's privacy concerns, regarding the
kinds of data and the purpose of data respectively, can be represented in
a two-by-two scheme which identiﬁes four types of possible sensitivi-
ties that peoplemay have about smart city data. Given the absence of re-
search about people's concerns about their local governments handling
their data, we do not include this in the grid. The resulting ﬁgure is plot-
ted in Fig. 1.
Because there is little concrete empirical research yet about how
people experience their privacy in smart cities (but see Belanche-
Gracia, Casaló-Ariño, & Pérez-Rueda (2015) for an exception), the actual
placement of smart city technologies and data in one of the four quad-
rants in this framework is based on extrapolating and combining the re-
search about people's privacy concerns discussed in the previous
paragraph and the smart city data landscape suggested in Table 1.
5.1. Personal data used for service purposes (I)
All kinds of traditional data collected and registered by the city about
its inhabitants are located in the ﬁrst quadrant of the framework. It in-
cludes, for instance, city registrations like civil status (birth, death, and
marriage), housing, elections or work. Data that people ﬁndmore sensi-
tive about their usage of social and economic care are also located in this
quadrant. In the digital era, this quadrant has been expanded with data
emerging from online transactions between city services and citizens,
and from social media behavior of residents and visitors.
Local governments collect and use these data to monitor demo-
graphic patterns of its residents, assess the quality of its interactions
with them and analyze civic moods. The purpose of these data is to un-
derpin city management and planning, enhance city services and sup-
port local citizens. The privacy challenge in this quadrant is likely to
be moderate, because, ﬁrst, this kind of data has been part and parcel
of city management all along and have rarely been subject to civic con-
cerns. Second, because of the service purpose, citizens are likely to expe-
rience a positive tradeoff between handing over personal data and
receiving, for instance, social beneﬁts. However, especially in the latter
case, there is a continuous risk of the perception of these data practices
moving into the second quadrant, in which highly personal data are
used for surveillance purposes. The Dutch System Risk Identiﬁcation
(SyRI), for instance, allows local governments to mine beneﬁt registers
in case of justiﬁable doubt about fraud. This is a controversial practice
and particular groups of citizens may experience a thin line between
service and surveillance here.
5.2. Personal data used for surveillance purposes (II)
This quadrant covers personal data, collected andmonitored for sur-
veillance purposes. It involves all police data, from minor violations to
stop and search to criminal offence; it also involves data of local author-
ities such as public transport or port authorities. Digital and software in-
novations have added another layer to these data, for instance, the use
of facial recognition software to analyze the images captured by CCTV
cameras. Evidently, all such data are directly personal and citizens will
often experience such data as highly sensitive (e.g. Samatas, 2008).
The combination of highly personal data collected and used for the
purposes of surveillance and government control make this quadrant
a highly contested one, with new data initiatives persistently under
scrutiny of privacy advocates. The mayor of the French city Nice, for in-
stance, won the ironic Big Brother Award in 2008 for his controversial
decision to install the most pervasive and expensive video surveillance
system in France. The city of Dresden received the award in 2012 for
logging and tracing mobile phone trafﬁc during a massive anti-Nazi
demonstration.
Such infringes notwithstanding, the combination of personal data
and surveillance purposes is subject to strong legal and regulatory
4 E.g. http://www.enevo.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/a4_enevo_general_
en_v4.pdf; or http://www.urbiotica.com/en/smart-solutions/intelligent-waste-
management/.
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stance, sets strict rules for the legitimate usage of personal data, offers
a stronger position to citizens to control their data (including, among
other things ‘The right to be forgotten’) and imposes high ﬁnes on
data abuse, for which the data processor will be held responsible. For
city governments, engaged in many new data initiatives, this means
that a solid knowledge of the often complex privacy regulations be-
comes a new requirement as well (Cresswell & Pardo, 2002).
5.3. Impersonal data used for surveillance purposes (III)
The data in this quadrant concern all data that cannot be linked to an
individual person and are used for surveillance and control purposes.
Such data come from, for example, themonitoring of trafﬁcﬂows, public
transport, crowd, sports and event management through, among
others, infrared video, CCTV or heat sensors. Such data may not auto-
matically be perceived as sensitive, as they do not measure individuals
but rather impersonal crowds or ﬂows of vehicles. Similarly impersonal
data for surveillance purposes comes from the aggregation and combi-
nation of survey and registration data in the city. The city of Rotterdam,
for instance, has a Central Policy Information System inwhich data from
various sources can be combined to answer pertinent or emerging pol-
icy questions. Such data are also often used in combination with geo-
graphical information systems. On the basis of postal codes and, for
instance, police statistics, beneﬁts and insolvency registers, housing
and commerce information, particular city areas can be proﬁled as hav-
ing high risks of economic or social unrest. Most developments around
predictive policing and the identiﬁcation of neighborhoods or streets
with high crime risks, are based on the aggregation and articulation of
data with postal codes (e.g. Perry, McInnis, Carter, Smith, &
Hollywood, 2013).
All of such data can be analyzed and enhanced in ways that make it
possible to identify individual citizens, thusmaking previous imperson-
al data suddenly highly personal. Through facial recognition software
individuals in crowds can be recognized, and proﬁling on the basis of lo-
cation data can be done so precisely that individual households can be
identiﬁed. For such reasons, data practices like this have become subject
to civil, political and individual suspicion, constituting a highly volatile
policy arena. In the United States in particular, many civic organisations
have protested against their local police acquiring predictive software,
arguing that predictive algorithms inherit the biases present in standard
policing, and perpetuate racist and prejudiced proﬁling (cf. Koss, 2015).
5.4. Impersonal data collected for service purposes (IV)
A big chunk of current smart city technologies and data usage con-
cern impersonal data collected and used for the direct beneﬁt of the
city environment, the well-being of citizens and more efﬁcient city op-
erations. One can think of monitoring systems for air, noise and water
quality; energy systems that are tailored to real-time usage; smart
waste management; and so on. The data used for these applications
are about ‘things’ rather than about people, and may therefore be less
sensitive. All data that cities nowadays make available through their
open data portals are also located in this quadrant, as privacy regula-
tions prevent cities to publish any other kind of data (cf. Zuiderwijk,
Janssen, Choenni, Meijer, & Alibaks, 2012). Note, however, that there
are signiﬁcant national differences with respect to open data, with Nor-
way presenting an extreme case of making citizen tax returns available
to all members of the public since 1800; currently the rank order of tax
payers in Norway is online. Like in quadrant III, one ﬁnds here aggregat-
ed register and survey data in combination with location facts, produc-
ing information relevant to improve city services, rather than
surveillance. City public health policies increasingly make use of such
indicators, identifying, for instance, areas with high air or noise pollu-
tion and their correlation with particular disease patterns (e.g. Erdem,
Prins, Voorham, Van Lenthe, and Burdorf, 2015).The combination of impersonal data with service purposes seems to
make this quadrant a rather ‘innocent’ one for policy and government,
because security breaches and data-abuse are unlikely to have signiﬁ-
cant and direct effects on individual citizens. Nevertheless, here too,
there are privacy concerns coming from increasingly detailed methods
of proﬁling which may enable the re-identiﬁcation of individuals from
aggregate and anonymized data (e.g. Kitchin, 2014c).
6. Using the privacy framework
The privacy framework can be used in two combined ways: ﬁrst, to
develop a set of academic hypotheses that contribute to amore situated
understanding of people's privacy concerns; and second, to understand
the policy challenges that speciﬁc smart city technologies and data
usage may throw up to local governments. Three examples will illus-
trate this double potential.
6.1. Example 1: smart waste technologies
Cities are currently all considering the acquisition of smart technol-
ogies forwastemanagement to reduce cost and enhance efﬁciency. Sev-
eral kinds of smart solutions have been introduced involving among
other things, bins with sensors that measure how full the bin is. Only
when a certain level of waste in the bin has been reached, a dustcart
will come to empty it. According to some companies promoting their
smart waste solutions, this can help save cities up to 50% of their costs
in waste logistics.4 Some types of smart bins only involve a sensor that
measures the level of waste, whereas others enable the simultaneous
authentication of the user through smart card access. When plotting
these different solutions into the matrix, we see how the privacy con-
cerns may change as well.
The bin in the below left quadrant of thematrix onlymeasures if the
bin is almost full and needs emptying. It is unclearwho has thrown stuff
in, but the system does make sure the bin will be emptied in time: im-
personal data combinedwith a service purpose are unlikely to raise pri-
vacy concerns. The bin in the upper right quadrant requires card
authentication by the person who wants to throw their garbage away.
While authentication and the prevention of illegal dumping may be
the main purpose of this system, it also enables the collection of highly
personal data about who throws away howmuch in that particular bin.
The additional data potential of the bin does comes with the cost of it
moving from an innocent technology to a privacy sensitive one (Fig. 2).
Theplacement of thewastemanagement technologies in theprivacy
framework is based on the extrapolation of the reviewed academic re-
search about privacy concerns. When articulated more precisely in the
context of city-waste management, the suggestion emerges that the
choice and usage of a particular operational technology is a key variable
for raising people's privacy concerns. This suggestion produces a useful
hypothesis for research about people's privacy concerns regarding
smart solutions for city problems, for instance those for smart parking
(contrasting sensors indicating whether there is a car above the sensor
with systems based on CCTV registrations); or for smart lighting (con-
trasting measuring people movement by heat sensors with systems
using cameras).
6.2. Example 2: predictive policing
Predictive policing involves using individual and aggregate data to
analyses crime patterns and enhance police performance. Initially, pre-
dictive policing took place on the basis of statistics of the places and
types where particular crimes happened in the past: thus, areas with
high reports of burglary and vehicle theft were identiﬁed and expected
Fig. 2. Contrasting privacy concerns for smart waste management.
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these areas during the predicted time slots, is said to have signiﬁcantly
reduced those crimes in a number of US cities (Braga, Papachristos, &
Hureau, 2014). The data used for such forms of predictive policing are
impersonal and aggregated; hence such form of predictive policing
can be located in the lower right quadrant of the smart city privacy chal-
lenges. However, predictive policing may move quickly to the upper
right quadrant of the model if the data mining techniques are usedFig. 3. Contrasting governance chabeyond the identiﬁcation of times and places, and try to predict not
only types of crime but also types of offenders. Based on data mining
of the features of convicted criminals, risk proﬁles are made which can
identify who is likely to commit a crime in the near future. Increasingly,
social media data come into the equation and it is the particular linking
of diverse data sets which changes the practice of preventive policing
into a highly problematic one that touches immediately on the privacy
of individuals. Privacy advocates argue that the predicted combinationllenges for predictive policing.
Fig. 4. Contrasting governance challenges for social city media.
478 L. van Zoonen / Government Information Quarterly 33 (2016) 472–480of place and types of people turns all inhabitants of a particular city into
potential criminals.
Here too, the placement of predictive policing in the privacy frame-
work is based on the extrapolation of the reviewed academic research
about privacy concerns. The hypothesis that can be developed from
this example is that privacy concernswill varywith the particular (com-
binations of) data and analytic tools that are used, contrasting, not only,
aggregated procedures to the ones that enable individual proﬁling, but
also contrasting service to surveillance purposes. Does individual proﬁl-
ing raise less concern if people perceive they proﬁt immediately and
tangibly from enhanced city services, a question that is elaborated in
the next example (Fig. 3).6.3. Example 3: social media monitoring
Most cities nowadays use an array of social media to promote them-
selves and communicate with their citizens. The city of Rotterdam, for
instance, has more than 30 thematic and neighborhood Twitter ac-
counts, several Facebook and LinkedIn pages, and furthermore an ex-
tensive presence on YouTube, Flickr, Instagram and Pinterest. The city
has been praised for its activities and for its quick response to citizen re-
quests living up to its rule that every request should have a response
within two hours.5 The data generated on these social media accounts
are systematically monitored through dedicated social media analytics
and sentiment analysis, and provide information about the particular
networks that the Rotterdam civil servants are engaged in, but also in
the networks of Rotterdam inhabitants, public opinion, tensions in par-
ticular areas, and so on. The data produced and collected through social
media are by deﬁnition tied to individuals and hence personal, although
some people do not consider their socialmedia behavior as personal (as
discussed in Section 4.1). The purpose of social media usage by local
governments is mostly to provide services and enhance the city's re-
sponsiveness to its citizens. In addition, there is an increasing interest5 http://www.socialmediameetlat.nl/pdf/digiloog/36%20berrevoets.pdf.to explore whether social media analytics can replace more extensive
data sources such as a yearly or bi-annual city survey or census (Data
for Policy, 2015).
It is thusﬁrmly located in theupper left quadrant of themodel. How-
ever, aswith other forms of socialmedia analytics, the potential tomine
thedata formore personalized information and targeting of city services
are endless and hence, there is a continuous risk of these services being
pulled towards the more problematic quadrant where privacy is at
stake, and purpose may shift away from service to surveillance.
Like in the example about predictive policing, the main hypothesis
to be examined inmore detail here, is that privacy concernswill depend
on the (combinations of) data, and analytic tools and procedures that
are used to enhance city services. Moreover, given the research about
costs and beneﬁts of revealing personal data (discussed in Section 4),
an additional question to explore is this depends on the kind of services
the city offers (Fig. 4).
7. Conclusion and implications
In this paper a framework was presented to identify what kind of
privacy concerns the use of smart technologies and of (big, open and
linked) data produce may raise among people (as citizens, workers,
consumers or travelers) in smart cities Asserting, on the basis of existing
research about privacy perceptions, that these concerns are
underpinned by the way people perceive particular data as personal
or impersonal, and that their concerns differ according to the purpose
for which data is collected (service or surveillance), four areas of con-
cerns emerge that range from hardly any (impersonal data, service pur-
pose), to extremely high (personal data, surveillance purpose). The
framework was then used to explore how speciﬁc technologies (smart
bin, smart parking), and data usage (predictive policing, social media
monitoring) may produce variable privacy concerns. This resulted in a
general hypothesis that the choice of smart technologies and the
usage of particular (combinations of) data and analytic tools are crucial
factors to understand people's privacy concerns in smart cities (in addi-
tion to their perception ofwhat kind of data forwhich purpose are being
479L. van Zoonen / Government Information Quarterly 33 (2016) 472–480used). There is both an applied need to further substantiate the empir-
ical relation between data, purpose and technology/tools, and a funda-
mental one to produce a more situated, theoretical understanding of
people's privacy concerns in smart cities. Using the framework will
make the systematic accumulation of such concrete investigations eas-
ier, but also enables consistent comparisons between cities, in national
as well as international contexts.
The hypothetical status of the framework does not prevent its us-
ability; it can helpfully operate as a sensitizing instrument for
policymakers and operational managers in the smart city ﬂagging up
in which contexts privacy concerns among their citizens may occur.
Some of these concerns are covered by the new EU regulation regarding
the processing of personal data. However, as it becomes ever easier to
construct individual proﬁles from impersonal data, additional strategies
and regulation may be necessary (cf. Data for Policy, 2015). Moreover,
smart city technologies and data developments are so quick and ubiqui-
tous that ofﬁcial legislationmay fall short for the decades to come. Final-
ly, as the earlier sections about the privacy paradox showed (see Section
4), people's concerns and perceptions are not always very consistent or
predictable. For smart city governments, the challenge is thus threefold:
- identify which privacy concerns for their citizens may be at stake
with speciﬁc technologies and data practices;
- identify if and how these are subject to the EU data protection regu-
lation;
- develop a speciﬁc city policy on new developments that accommo-
dates the concerns of citizens, beyond the bare legal necessities.
While these recommendationsmay seem too obvious, individual cit-
izens or collective citizen groups are often ignored as partners in the de-
velopment of smart city technologies or innovations (cf. Leydesdorff,
2012). However, the input and support of individual and collective
civil actors is of crucial importance, as they will have to live with and
within the smart dataﬁed cities on an everyday basis.
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